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TRUTH AND THE LIAR PARADOX
NIK WEAVER
1.
The liar paradox is the paradox that arises when we try to assess the truth
value of the sentence “This sentence is not true.” We call this sentence the “liar
sentence”. Assuming it is true leads immediately to a contradiction, so it must not
be true. But that is what it asserts, so it must be true after all, which is absurd.
The paradox may seem frivolous, but what is worrisome about it is not that there
is any pressing need to assign a truth value to the liar sentence itself. The broad
concern is rather that our inability to resolve the paradox reveals a fundamental
deficit in our understanding of truth and/or logic. If our grasp of either of these
topics is faulty, then the grand edifice of modern mathematics is called into question.
If there is a specific erroneous step in the paradoxical deduction, and we are unable
to pinpoint it, then this means that some deductive principle we believe to be valid
is not.
That is not to say that there is any likelihood of simple arithmetical truths
ever being overturned, under any circumstances. But mathematics extends well
beyond simple arithmetic, and not all of the principles on which it is based are
so clearly established. Without a complete understanding of the liar paradox and
related problems (Russell’s paradox, etc.), we will never be able to definitively say
which of these principles are genuinely trustworthy. We do have apparently reliable
techniques for avoiding paradoxical reasoning, but these are engineering solutions.
They are not based on a fundamental understanding of the underlying logical issues.
The liar paradox is strikingly resistant to resolution. One’s first reaction may
be that the liar sentence is simply meaningless, or that it does not have a truth
value in a conventional sense. But it is not meaningless to assert of a meaningless
sentence, or one that lacks a truth value, that it is not true. That kind of assertion
is meaningful and correct. Yet this is just what the liar sentence says of itself, so
this naive approach fails immediately.
The raw intuition that the liar sentence lacks meaningful content has led to a
variety of more sophisticated technical responses, none of which, however, fares
much better than the naive response. The liar sentence is said to be “ungrounded”
or “indeterminate”, both of which would seem to imply that it is, indeed, correct
in saying of itself that it is not flatly true. Perhaps one wishes to draw a distinc-
tion between grounded and ungrounded truth, but then one has to deal with the
sentence that asserts of itself that it is not true in either sense. At that point the
distinction no longer seems particularly helpful. While it is certainly clear that a
straightforward attempt to determine the truth value of the liar sentence leads to
an infinite regress, it is not so obvious how that observation helps to resolve the
paradox. We can still talk about such ungrounded sentences, and they, apparently,
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can talk about themselves. We might try to say that the truth value of the liar
sentence is unstable, that it should in some way be thought of as flipping back and
forth between truth and falsehood. Very well, then what about the sentence that
asserts of itself that it is continually false, and never true? It is hard to see how
that sentence could ever be true, again leading us back to a contradiction.
Another class of approaches bring in ideas of “context” or “situation”. This
seems reasonable at first, since most sentences do not have a fixed truth value, but
rather one which varies depending on the context in which they are asserted or the
situation at which they are directed. On the other hand, it is precisely the assertions
of pure logic, into which category the liar sentence appears to fall, which are not
dependent on context, so the relevance of these kinds of considerations to the liar
paradox is questionable. In any case, we can easily build context-independence
into the liar sentence, by modifying it to explicitly assert of itself that it is not true
in any context. The idea that there could be contexts in which this modified liar
sentence is true is, again, hard to accept.
One may be tempted to try to somehow preempt the sort of objection we have
been making. We could try to say that every sentence has to be interpreted in some
limited context, even the modified liar sentence just mentioned which purports to
refer globally to all contexts. At this point the analysis becomes farcical: the claim
that one cannot refer globally to all contexts itself refers globally to all contexts
and is therefore self-defeating. So we do not seem to have made much progress.
A completely different type of solution advises that the liar sentence is both true
and not true. But all this does is to eliminate the difficulty by, in effect, declaring it
not to be a difficulty. Surely, to allow a sentence to be simultaneously true and not
true is merely to change the meaning of the word “not”. We may well have a trivial
resolution of the liar paradox as it applies to languages in which “not” carries some
nontraditional meaning, but obviously this does not address the original problem.
2.
It appears that something must be wrong with our naive conception of truth.
This is surprising because it seems like truth is a definite property of sentences
whose content is exactly captured by Tarski’s biconditional [2]
pAq is true ↔ A, (∗)
where A stands for an arbitrary sentence. We would have to accept that this intu-
ition is somehow mistaken. But perhaps our intuition about truth was developed
on the basis of unproblematic cases and we are wrong to assume that it remains
valid when applied to exotic (e.g., self-referential) sentences. Indeed, it is not so
clear that the notion of truth is well-defined in the case of the liar sentence, which
strongly suggests that the naive picture may be misleading, or at least incomplete.
If we decide that our intuition about truth is unreliable, then the paradox loses
much of its force. It merely shows that there can be no predicate with the prop-
erties that we expect a truth predicate to have. Our focus then shifts to the more
straightforwardly technical question, to what extent is it possible to use (∗) to define
a workable concept of truth?
Since (∗) tells us, for any sentence A, the exact condition for A to be true,
one might think that we could assert it as a definition of truth for all sentences.
But this is impossible, for purely syntactic reasons. The expression “For every
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sentence A, pAq is true if and only if A” is ungrammatical because the variable A
functions ambiguously. In the quantifying phrase “For every sentence A” it acts as
a reference to an arbitrary sentence, not an assertion of it; but on the right side
of the biconditional it has to be construed as having assertoric force. The entire
expression is ungrammatical in the same way that “There exists a sentence A such
that A” is ungrammatical. We should rather say “There exists a sentence A such
that A is true,” except that this assumes we already have a truth predicate which
applies to arbitrary sentences. In other words, in order to use (∗) to formulate a
global definition of truth we need some device for asserting a mentioned sentence,
which is just to say that we need to already have a global truth predicate.
We must understand (∗) to be not a genuine assertion, but rather a “schematic”
assertion, something which only becomes a genuine assertion when some particular
sentence is substituted for A. Thus, although we cannot quantify over A, we can
legitimately use (∗) to define the truth of individual sentences by saying things like
“ ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.” Modulo finitistic concerns, we
could even conjoin all substitution instances of (∗), as A ranges over all the sentences
of some language, and thereby produce a truth definition for that language. But this
construction would have to take place within some (infinitary) metalanguage, and
there would always be sentences in that metalanguage to which the truth predicate
just defined did not apply. In particular, the truth definition would itself be such a
sentence, as it could never appear in one of its own conjuncts.
But even this schematic interpretation does not straightforwardly work for sen-
tences that themselves refer to truth. Assuming we have abandoned our naive
intuition for truth and are now treating the word “true” as initially undefined, it
follows that sentences that explicitly refer to truth are not initially meaningful and
hence cannot be subtituted into (∗) to produce a definition of truth. That would
be circular, because the substituted sentence needs to function assertorically on the
right side of (∗).
Despite this difficulty, there are ways to define truth predicates that apply in at
least some cases to sentences which themselves contain truth predicates. The most
obvious way to do this is, following Tarski, to construct a well-ordered sequence
of truth predicates trueα, each of which satisfies (∗) when applied to sentences
containing only truth predicates with lower indices. This resolves the circularity
issue. Another natural approach, due to Kripke [1], is to work with a single truth
predicate but to define its range of application in a well-ordered sequence of stages.
The idea here is that even a partial definition of truth may be sufficient to give
some sentences that contain the word “true” a definite truth value. So every time
the range of application of the truth predicate grows, more sentences are assigned
truth values, and this creates an opportunity to expand the range of application
even further.
3.
Both the Tarskian and the Kripkean schemes are natural solutions of the problem
of using (∗) to define truth. However, neither can be considered a complete solution.
There is a “revenge” problem arising from liar type sentences targeted specifically
at the two constructions, namely the sentences “This sentence is not trueα for any
level α of Tarski’s construction” and “This sentence does not evaluate as true at
any stage of Kripke’s construction.” Provided that we are working with a language
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that is sufficiently expressive to allow us to formulate these assertions, it is easy to
see that, indeed, the first of them is not trueα for any α, and the second does not
evaluate as true at any stage. That is to say, both sentences can be proven. But
the truth predicates we have constructed are evidently too limited to allow us to
say that these sentences are true.
Thus, in both cases there are sentences that we can assert but whose truth we
cannot assert, and this means that a further application of (∗) would, in both cases,
lead to a truth predicate with broader scope. This phenomenon is obviously not
specific to the two constructions under consideration. To describe it in general,
we might wish to define a partial truth predicate to be any predicate T such that
T (A) → A holds for all sentences A. This expresses the idea that everything
recognized as true really is true, but some true sentences might not be recognized.
We would then say that we have no single notion of truth; instead, we have a
hierarchy of partial truth predicates, and there is a corresponding hierarchy of liar
sentences, each of which escapes paradox by not falling within the scope of the
truth predicate to which it refers. The lesson of the liar paradox would be that
there is no maximal partial truth predicate.
However, we cannot do this. Our definition of partial truth predicates is illegiti-
mate because the word “holds” functions as a synonym for “is true”. We might just
as well say that T is a partial truth predicate if T (A)→ A is true for all sentences
A. In other words, we need to have a global truth predicate before we can say what
constitutes a partial truth predicate. It really is necessary because both the T on
the left and the A on the right of T (A) → A must be assertoric, so without the
intervention of a truth predicate they cannot be quantified. We discussed this kind
of syntactic problem earlier.
This syntactic difficulty is genuine. If we allowed ourselves to ignore it then we
would have to also allow a sentence which asserts that no partial truth predicate
holds of itself. This sentence would be paradoxical in the same way as the original
liar sentence since we could immediately substitute it into (∗) and obtain a partial
truth predicate that applies to it. It therefore appears that the idea of partial truth
is just as problematic as the idea of truth.
Consequently, although we can see that our ability to go beyond the Tarskian
and Kripkean constructions is a general phenomenon, there is no obvious way for
us to properly express this fact. This state of affairs is clearly unacceptable. We
may have succeeded in convincing ourselves that our naive intuition for a global
notion of truth is illusory, and this could make the ban on universally quantifying
(∗) palatable. We can see it as accomplishing the benign task of preventing us
from fomulating a bad definition that affirms a faulty intuition and has paradoxical
consequences. But our corresponding inability to define the notion of a partial
truth predicate is harder to swallow. It is quite clear that we do have an open-
ended ability to use (∗) to construct partial truth definitions, and yet somehow we
cannot say this.
The same problem was actually present in our initial discussion of (∗). When
we made the comment that (∗) could be used schematically to define the truth of
any sentence, we did not notice that this statement, too, cannot be grammatically
formulated unless a global truth predicate is already available. We cannot say
“For any meaningful sentence A, (∗) can be used to define a predicate T such that
T (A)↔ A.” Proper syntax demands something like “For any meaningful sentence
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A, (∗) can be used to define a predicate T such that T (A) ↔ A is true” or “such
that T (A) is true if and only if A is true”, so again, we need to already have a
global truth predicate.
4.
What has been missing from this discussion is an explicit acknowledgement of
the constructive quality of Tarski’s biconditional. We alluded to it just now in our
comment that we have an open-ended ability to construct partial truth definitions.
It is inherent in the nature of (∗) both that we have a global ability to use it to
define truth in limited settings, and that we can always go beyond any such setting
to produce a more inclusive definition. We are having difficulty precisely expressing
this idea because we are trying to express it in classical terms.
Fortunately, there is a well-developed theoretical apparatus for dealing with con-
structive phenomena. We have a form of reasoning, intuitionistic logic, which is
suited to this kind of setting, and we have an interpretation of the logical con-
stants, the BHK or “proof” interpretation, which supports this form of reasoning.
The identification of provability as the key primitive concept in terms of which
constructive reasoning is based is crucial because it provides us with the linguistic
tool that we need to handle use/mention problems of the type that arose in our
attempts to define truth and partial truth. In particular, the constructivist solu-
tion to the problem of defining truth is to simply equate it with provability. Thus,
letting A stand for “A is provable”, i.e., there exists a proof of A, we can say
A is constructively true ↔ A. (∗∗)
Observe that neither appearance of A in (∗∗) is assertoric, so there is no syntactic
obstruction to quantifying over A in this expression. We are free to say that for
any sentence A, A is constructively true if and only if A is provable. Thus the
constructive notion of truth is genuinely global in scope.
The other problematic aspect of (∗), that it becomes circular when applied to
sentences containing the word “true”, also does not translate to (∗∗). We take prov-
ability to be an objective notion that exists independently of our characterization
of it, so that there is nothing ill-defined about the provability of sentences which
themselves refer to provability.
The difficulty we encountered in trying to define partial truth predicates can
be avoided in a similar way. We can define a predicate T to be a partial truth
predicate if for any sentence A the implication T (A)→ A is provable. This finesses
the syntactic problem discussed earlier and provides us with a global notion of
partial truth. We might also say that a sentence A falls within the scope of a
partial truth predicate T if the biconditional T (A) ↔ A is provable, and that one
partial truth predicate, T1, is subordinate to another, T2, if for every sentence A the
implication T1(A)→ T2(A) is provable. This enables us to make the comment that
we tried to make earlier, about there being a hierarchy of partial truth predicates
and a corresponding hierarchy of liar sentences.
Note that under the above definition of partial truth there is no requirement that
the predicate T must itself be constructive. To the contrary, we can define partial
truth predicates in wide generality using either Tarskian or Kripkean techniques.
To give one example, we can define Goldbach’s conjecture to be true if and only if
every even number greater than two is a sum of two primes. Whether Goldbach’s
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conjecture has a constructive truth value is immaterial here; what matters is that
under this definition Goldbach’s conjecture and the truth of Goldbach’s conjecture
are provably equivalent. Thus, although the notion of what constitutes a partial
truth predicate is constructive, partial truth predicates may themselves be highly
nonconstructive.
A variety of notions of truth are available. There is a global constructive truth
predicate and there is a hierarchy of classical truth predicates with limited scope.
What we cannot have is a global classical truth predicate.
5.
Bringing constructive ideas into play has given us the ability to globally discuss
partial truth predicates, but by introducing a new, constructive notion of truth it
also exposes us to a new version of the liar paradox. What are we to make of the
“provable liar” sentence that asserts of itself that it is not provable, or the sentence
that asserts that no partial truth predicate provably holds of itself?
Since the notion of constructive truth is global in scope, the provable liar sentence
cannot be handled in the same way as the classical liar sentence. On the other hand,
a paradox is less immediate here because the validity of Tarski’s biconditional is not
directly evident in the constructive setting. We cannot just assume that asserting
A is equivalent to asserting that A is provable. There is clearly some relationship
between the two statements, but we have to determine what that relationship is.
At first sight it appears that asserting A is provable is stronger than merely
asserting A. In one direction, we have no reason to expect that every classically
true statement must be provable. But in the other direction, it seems clear that
valid reasoning must always lead to a true conclusion. If there is any doubt about
this, surely we can simply build it into our notion of what counts as a valid proof.
Thus, we can apparently affirm A→ A but not its converse.
However, this reasoning assumes that we are using classical logic and that a
classical notion of truth is available. If we are working in a setting in which atomic
sentences might not have definite truth values, or we lack a classical truth predicate,
then the conclusion we just reached must be reconsidered. First, there could be a
problem with the argument that we are free to fiat that valid proofs respect classical
truth; second, if a truth table definition of implication is unavailable, then we have
to switch to a constructive interpretation of implication, which changes the nature
of the question.
So before we go any further with the provable liar sentence we have to decide
whether the concepts present in it should be understood classically or constructively.
This comes down to the question of whether we have the right to assume that A
has a definite truth value for every sentence A.
In the constructivist literature one sometimes sees the claim that every assertion
of the form “p proves A” not only has a definite truth value but is even, in principle,
decidably true or false. However, this may be another case where our intuition is
developed on the basis of unproblematic cases and becomes unreliable when we
have to deal with self-referential phenomena. There could be situations where in
the course of assessing the validity of some alleged proof we need to first assess the
validity of some other alleged proof, and this creates the possibility for a vicious
circle.
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For instance, let A be the sentence “The sentence p is not a proof of this sentence”
and let p be the sentence “By inspection, this sentence is not a proof of the sentence
A.” If p is a proof of A then a falsehood is provable, so we surely want to say that
p does not prove A. However, decidability of the proof relation implies that if p
does not prove A, then this can be seen by inspection. If we accept this principle
and we agree that p does not prove A then we should also agree that the argument
“By inspection, p is not a proof of A” is a valid proof of the fact that p is not a
proof of A, which is just to say that we have to agree that p is a proof of A. So
there is a paradox.
A contradiction can be avoided by adopting the position that p is not a proof
of A, but that this cannot be seen by inspection. But this does not really help,
because if some argument has to be made to show that p is not a proof of A then
we ought to be able to incorporate that argument into p. For instance, we could
replace p with the sentence “If this sentence were a proof of A then a falsehood
would be provable, so this sentence is not a proof of A” or something of that sort.
A moment’s thought shows that the even more extreme position that p is not a
proof of A, but there is no way to see this, is straightforwardly self-defeating. (How
could we know this?)
The explicit labelling of A and p is not necessary either. We could take A to
be, say, the sentence “There is no proof of this sentence that is fewer than 1,000
characters long” and p to be the sentence “By inspection, no string of fewer than
1,000 characters is a proof of the sentence ‘There is no proof of this sentence that
is fewer than 1,000 characters long’.” (Or: if any such string were a proof of that
sentence then a falsehood would be provable, so no such string is a proof of that
sentence.)
What the preceding should show is that it is not so clear that every statement
of the form “p proves A” has a decidable (or even definite) truth value. We must
be careful to distinguish decidability of the proof relation from the weaker claim
that any proof can be recognized to be a proof. The latter clearly is inherent in our
notion of what proofs are; if a proof is an argument which is completely persuasive
to a rational mind, then certainly, in order for something to count as a proof its
validity must in principle be recognizable. But to infer decidability of the proof
relation we would have to be able to also affirm that anything which is not a proof
can be recognized not to be a proof. (Any Turing machine which halts on null
input can be recognized to halt on null input, but that does not mean we can
always decide whether a given Turing machine halts on null input.) This direction
is not obviously inherent in our notion of proof.
We conclude that reasoning classically about the general notion of provability is
unjustified. We have to reason constructively.
6.
Since the provable liar sentence explicitly involves the general notion of provabil-
ity, it must be understood constructively. We now need to determine the relation-
ship between A and A under constructive logic. The relevant question is whether
it is always possible to convert a proof of A into a proof of A, and vice versa.
First, we need to clarify what would constitute a proof of A. By definition, to
say that A is provable is to say that there exists a proof of A. So, letting p ⊢ A
stand for “p proves A”, a proof of A is a proof of (∃p)(p ⊢ A). But if we are
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reasoning constructively, any existence proof should in principle provide an explicit
instance. So q is a proof of A if and only if, for some p, q proves p ⊢ A.
Consider the implication A→ A. To prove this implication we must show how
to convert any proof of A into a proof of A. But when we are compelled by a
proof p to affirm an assertion A, we are simultaneously compelled to affirm the
assertion that p proves A. (If we do not realize that we have proven A, then we
have not proven A.) Thus, whenever p proves A it also proves p ⊢ A. So any proof
of A is also a proof of A, and this shows that the law A → A is constructively
valid.
Now consider the converse implication A → A. Here we must show how to
convert any proof of A into a proof of A. The obvious procedure in this case is,
given p and q such that q proves that p proves A, to discard q and return p. This
procedure succeeds if, whenever q proves that p proves A, p actually does prove
A. Informally, we need to know that proofs are reliable. But that is just what
we are trying to verify: in order to establish that A implies A, we already need
to know that (p ⊢ A) implies p ⊢ A. In contrast to the A → A direction, in
this direction the special case of statements of the form p ⊢ A is no more evident
than the general case. The obvious attempt to justify the law A→ A is therefore
circular.
In any instance where we have actually proven A, i.e., we have proven that
some p proves A, we ought to be willing to accept p as a proof of A and therefore
infer A. Making this deduction requires only that we accept the reliability of the
proof we have just given, not the global reliability of all proofs. So the passage
from A to A manifests as a deduction rule rather than an implication.
Can we build reliability into our notion of valid proof? That is, can we modify our
concept of proof so as to explicitly include the requirement that whenever p proves
A, A is true? In order to modify our notion of proof in this way we would need
to use a classical truth predicate. But until the meaning of provability is settled, a
classical truth predicate is not available for sentences like the provable liar which
explicitly refer to the notion of provability. We cannot use (∗) to define truth for
any sentence whose meaning is not settled, and we have not settled the meanings of
sentences which involve the notion of provability until we have specified our notion
of proof. So a classical truth predicate for such sentences is not available for us
to use when we are at the stage of specifying what counts as a proof. Therefore,
in this setting we cannot incorporate the requirement that only true sentences are
provable into our concept of proof.
All our attempts to justify the law A→ A under a constructive interpretation
of implication are ultimately circular. So we cannot assume this law is generally
valid. Only the direction A→ A can be universally asserted.
It may be helpful here to note that a similar restriction appears when we follow
Kripke’s prescription for using (∗) to generate a self-applicative truth predicate.
At any stage of the construction we are free to affirm that the currently available
predicate is sound, i.e., satisfies the law T (A) → A. That is, we can prove this
implication for any sentence A which lies within the current scope of T . However,
when extending the current predicate we do not assume that subsequent stages will
be sound. That would be patently circular, and it would generate a contradiction in
the following way. If we assume that all future extensions of the truth predicate we
are constructing will be sound, then a short deduction shows that the liar sentence
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which states that it does not evaluate as true at any stage will, indeed, not evaluate
as true at any stage. Thus, the soundness of all future stages entails this liar
sentence, and this is all we need to know in order to be justified in designating this
liar sentence as true at the next stage. In other words, it is only the possibility that
the liar sentence might be recognized as true at some future stage that prevents us
from recognizing it as true now. The lesson is that it is appropriate to affirm the
soundness of earlier stages, but wrong and dangerous to assume the soundness of
later stages. We may anticipate that future stages will be sound, but we cannot
employ this as a premise when generating the next stage.
The analogy is that disallowing A→ A as a proof principle involves a similar
restriction. Just as we cannot employ the premise that a not yet fully defined truth
predicate is globally sound in order to establish that a given sentence is true, we
cannot employ the premise that proofs are globally sound in order to establish that
a given proof is valid. Thus, since the justification of A→ A hinges on the global
soundness of all proofs, this justification fails.
7.
We are now in a position to determine what can be said about the provable
liar sentence. This sentence asserts that it is not provable, which we can express
symbolically as L ≡ ¬L. Now assuming L, we can immediately deduce ¬L.
But we can also deduce L by using the general law A → A. Combining these
statements, we get that L entails a contradiction, which means that we have proven
¬L. It follows that we can also prove ¬¬L.
But this does not directly lead to any paradox. If we could infer ¬L from
¬L, then the two conclusions we just reached would yield a contradiction. But
the implication goes in the other direction: in general we have ¬A → ¬A, not
conversely.
A minor variation on the provable liar sentence is the sentence which asserts
that its negation is provable. Here the formalization is L′ ≡ (¬L′), and we reach
slightly different conclusions. The results in this case are ¬¬L′ and L′ → ⊥, where
⊥ represents falsehood. Since ¬A equals A→ ⊥ by definition, we may say that the
weaker statement A → ⊥ represents “weak” falsity of A. Thus the conclusions
we reach are that ¬L′ is false and L′ is weakly false.
In order to satisfy ourselves about the consistency of this kind of reasoning, we
can set up a formal constructive self-referential propositional calculus. This is done
in [3], and we show there that the system is consistent. Thus we are able to reach
the substantive conclusions about L and L′ mentioned above without producing a
contradiction.
The analysis of the sentence which asserts that no partial truth predicate prov-
ably holds of itself is similar. Again, the absence of the law A → A blocks the
paradox. In the case of the provability paradox discussed in Section 4, the result is
that “p is a proof of A” is weakly false and “p is not a proof of A” is false.
Earlier we asserted that there can be no global classical truth predicate. The
way to make this idea precise is to assume that there is a predicate T such that
the biconditional T (A) ↔ A is provable for all sentences A; then taking A to be
the corresponding liar sentence allows us to deduce ⊥. So we conclude that the
existence of such a predicate is weakly false.
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8.
To summarize: the classical liar paradox is vacuous because there is no global
classical truth predicate. We are only able to define predicates which satisfy Tarski’s
biconditional in limited settings. But the global assertion that a truth definition
can be given for any meaningful sentence cannot be stated classically, only con-
structively.
In the constructive setting truth is equated with provability, and this is a global
notion. Therefore we do have a genuine constructive liar sentence. But here there
is no paradox because neither the law of excluded middle nor the law A→ A can
be universally affirmed.
Attempts to deal with the liar paradox typically propose some sort of restric-
tion on meaningful or acceptable sentences and then observe that the liar sentence
violates it. But the justification of the restriction, or even its mere expression, in-
variably violates the very same principle, making the whole account self-defeating.
We cannot reject all ungrounded assertions because the sentence which expresses
this prohibition is itself ungrounded. We cannot stratify sentences into types be-
cause the assertion that every sentence has a type does not itself have a type. We
cannot demand that every sentence be restricted to some local context because that
demand itself would have to be restricted to some local context. And so on.
This is just a consequence of treating a constructive phenomenon as if it were
classical. Indeed, no satisfactory classical conclusion can be drawn about the prov-
able liar sentence: coming to a firm conclusion about its truth or falsehood would
spell disaster either way. The way forward is to avoid contradiction by leaving open
the possiblity that the liar sentence might be recognized as having a definite truth
value. This outcome would be disastrous, but that does not license us to deny its
possibility. And that is good, because not denying this possibility is exactly what
blocks the paradox.
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